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CHINESE REGIONALISM: YESTERDAY AND TODAY 
BY FRANZ MICHAEL 
In a country the size of China, the problem of central control over 
the vast territory and the multitude of Chinese people is obviously of 
inherent complexity. whatever the system of government, China had 
to be divided and was divided into regional and local administrations 
to govern the country. In essence these were the provinces and 
districts which have remained largely unchanged over the centuries. 
Throughout Chinese history, central control over these regional 
subdivisions posed, however, recurring problems. Instead of serving 
simply as branches of the central government, these regional 
administrations could also use their local resources to defy central 
authority and to aspire to autonomy or even to challenge the central 
government's rule altogether. In that case "regionalism" connotes a 
counterpole to the centralized political and social order that has 
characterized Chinese state and society. A "region" in this tradition 
may then be defined as a distinct area of political, military, social and 
economic identity, somewhat related, but not necessarily synonymous 
with the provincial units or clusters of them into which China was 
divided in imperial, nationalist, and communist times. 
In essence the word "regionalism" as applied to China is to be 
understood as structural and institutional; it does not and should not 
assume the coloration of ethnic, racial, or dialectic-linguistic over-
tones that accompanies the concept in some European and other 
Western cases and is sometimes connected with the term "provincial-
ism." To some extent these latter characteristics may be found in 
some regions or subregional divisions of China, espeically in areas of 
minority populations; but in general they are not the dominant factor 
in the discussion of the problem of regionalism in China: past and 
present. 
Though the question of regionalism in China has remained an 
important problem as of today, its character has obviously undergone 
major changes together with the change of idelogy and institutions 
that have taken place between the imperial, the nationalist, and the 
communist systems. During each phase of Chinese history, the 
relationship between central power and regional authority depended 
on the political, social, economic, and ideological order of the time. To 
assess the present relationship, it will therefore be useful to compare 
and contrast it with the past. For this reason we preface the 
examination of the communist system with a short characterization 
of the imperial and nationalist situations. 
(1) 
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A. Historical Prologue: Imperial China· 
In imperial times, each dynasty was faced with the potential 
danger from regional military forces which could and did establish 
regional power bases, limiting and weakening central authority and 
eventually posing a threat to the dynasty's survival. The chief reason 
for this recurring problem was the limited function of the imperial 
state. Within the state the emperor was all powerlul, but the state 
itself was far more limited than any modern state, let alone a 
communist totalitarian state, and the society was then far more 
autonomous than its modern counterparts. 
The reason for this traditional relationship and for the concom-
itant problems of central control can be found in the basic institution-
al structure of the Chinese imperial state and society as determined 
by its ideology and of the consequences in the realm of military 
power, both contrasting fundamentally with the communist system. 
The ruling stratum in imperial state and society, in Max Weber's 
sense, was the Chinese gentry, a bureaucracy united by common 
beliefs and values and a common system of education. 1 In contrast to 
the party elite of modern times, the members of the gentry had their 
own ideological source of authority, independent of the state. Their 
Confucian concepts limited by definition the authority of the state 
and provided them with the social responsibility to manage society 
according to their Confucian concepts. As a result, the gentry, who 
held a monopoly on the official positions of the state, served in their 
large majority in positions of social leadership as teachers, managers 
of community organizations, arbiters of judicial disputes, and direc-
tors of public works, and in many other social and scholarly 
functions. In their dual role as officials and social leaders, the 
members of the gentry formed the link between a state whose 
functions were limited and the substantially autonomous social order. 
As state officials, the members of the gentry served a centralized 
system, but as social leaders they were regionally located and active 
on their own. Their social leadership did not depend on any imperial 
command. It was autonomous; indeed, they believed that they carried 
the burden of the world on their shoulders. 
· -- - Acollapse of the dynasty did not affect the social order and the 
· role of the gentry with whose help the dynastic structure was ever 
again_ r~built. In fact, it was the autonomy of the gentry and the link 
. -- i. For a study of the Chinese gentry, see Chung-li Chang, The Chinese Gentry: 
Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth Century Chinese Society, "Introduction," by Franz 
Michael; Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955. 
CHINESE REGIONALISM 3 
with regional officials which the dynasties tried to curb to prevent 
the very regional threat that could lead to their downfall. All the 
policies to keep the officials in the emperors' "basket" were designed 
to serve this purpose. To prevent the provincial officials from 
combining all regional power in any one hand and to cooperate too 
intimately with the regional gentry, the imperial government 
followed the principle of divide and rule. Aside from provincial 
governors - and the few governors general who ruled over two or 
three provinces - the imperial government appointed provincial 
commissioners on revenue, justice, education and provincial 
military commanders, all of whom dealt directly with the respective 
boards in Peking and in some cases reported on each other in a 
system of check and balance. A policy of limited tenure and of 
avoiding appointments in any candidates home area was designed to 
keep the officials from linking up with the provincial gentry. These 
measures still form an interesting backdrop to today's communist 
policy of maintaining a check on provincial authorities. Their failure 
led in imperial times to the decline of the dynasties. 
The danger of undermining imperial authority by regional 
defiance occurred, however, in its final stage through a breakdown of 
military control. It was the combination of political with military 
power on a regional level that spelled disaster for dynastic govern-
ment. In times of disintegration, weakening dynastic power, banditry 
and oppressive cooruption leading to rebellions, local forces and 
regional armies were formed under gentry and non-gentry leadership 
as a matter of self-defense or in competition with regional rivals. 
These armies were loyal to their commanders, regardless of whether 
the latter were rebels or loyalists. As provincial armies, especially 
the models of Ming or Ching time, or as rebel forces that emerged 
from regional organizations, they weakened central authority, there-
by inviting foreign aggression or leading to the dynasty's overthrow 
from within. It had therefore been imperial policy to retain control of 
all military forces, a policy that frequently broke down at the time of 
dynastic weakening and decline. The military disintegration reached 
its culmination during the period of warlordism;2 but t~e problem of 
2. The term "warlordism" describes the situation in modem Chinese history 
when political power was in the hands of regional military leaders who fought among 
themselves for control of territory and tax income which they largely regarded as their 
personal spoils. The period of warlordism per se lasted from 1916 to 1927, but warlord 
rule in many provinces continued into the early years of the national government. See 
Franz H. Michael and George E. Taylor, The Far East in the Modern World, (3d ed., 
Hinsdale, lll.: The Dryden Press, 1975), pp. 371-374. 
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military power centers remained an issue also under the communist 
regime. 
Confucian Ideology. In listing these traditional elements of 
regionalism, the problem of provincial structure and military com-
mand in a limited imperial state, the question of the motive force and 
goals of regional development has so far been mentioned only in 
passing. Yet in the assessment of the importance of the regional 
potential, past and present, this question may be most crucial. In 
imperial times regionalism could have two purposes. If it led to 
erosion of dynastic authority and strengthening of regional gentry 
powers as in the 19th century under Tseng Kuo-fan and Li 
Hung-chang,3 it aimed simply at a shift in power within the existing 
dynasty without attempting - at least for the time being - to 
unseat the government itself. If it aimed at the overthrow of the 
dynasty and the establishment of a new dynastic regime, it was a 
challenge to a specific dynastic control In neither case did it aim at 
destroying the Confucian order of state and society or, more 
important still, at splitting the Middle Kingdom into new separate 
independent states. The struggle was for power within an accepted 
order. Only in the mid-nineteenth century, under the impact of the 
West did this order itself come under attack by the Tai-ping 
Rebellion,4 the beginning of a new phase in Chinese history.· Up to 
that time and even though in practice imperial China experienced 
periods of prolonged dismemberment, the concept of unity within the 
Confucian order prevailed. Even during the north-south division from 
the third to the sixth century A.D.,5 the ideal of unity under 
3. Tseng Kuo-fan (1811-1872) and Li Hung-chang (1823-1901) were high 
officials under the Ch'ing Dynasty who formed their own provincial armies to defend 
the Dynasty against the Taiping Rebellion and became governors-general of the 
central and lower Yangtse region respectively, establishing their own regional 
organizations. See ibid., pp. 186-94. 
4. The Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), a massive uprising against the Ch'ing 
Dynasty, was in part caused by economic and political deterioration typical for the 
declining period of each dynasty. But it derived its unique character from its 
organization under fanatical religious leadership which believed in a mission of 
establishing a form of radical Christianity, the "heavenly kingdom," on earth, 
replacing the Confucian order. See Franz Michael, The Taiping Rebellion, Vol, I, 
History, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966. 
5. During the period of the 3d to 6th centuries A.D., China was divided between 
the northern part of the country, ruled by a number of dynasties established by outside 
invaders, and the South, ruled by dynasties formed by indigenous houses. In both 
regions Buddhism made large inroads in religion, art, social life, and politics, but 
Confucianism, enriched by Buddhism, prevailed and remained the dominant cultural 
and political force. 
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Confucian dynastic rule was not abandun~u. ·1.1<; 1 easou wa6 LhaL 
even under the impact of Buddhism, and certainly at all other times, 
the Confucian roof remained over the impaired edifice of Chinese 
state and society and, under it, the building was eventually repaired. 
B. Nationalist China: The Unfinished Solution 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the role of the gentry 
ended. Without the validity of Confucianism, regionalism degener-
ated into warlordism. But under the national government a system of 
modern laws and a modern trained officialdom were meant to serve a 
state whose functions in law, education, and other social activities 
were intended to cover a much wider area than that of the imperial 
past. In the economy, the development of private enterprise was to be 
protected by modern Western law. The modernization of China 
appeared to be well on the way, but major problems remained. They 
were chiefly military and forced the national government to adopt. a 
policy of military priority. Of the three chief obstacles to unification 
and establishment of a true nation-state, only one was regional in 
character: the problem of warlordism, which not only stood in the 
way of political central control, but also kept most of the local tax, in 
particular the land tax, out of government hands, thereby weakening 
. national financial strength and forcing heavy reliance on the modern 
sector of the economy. The other two obstacles, communist opposition 
and Japanese aggression, were of national dimensions. The commun-
ists, practically defeated in 1937,6 were revived, thanks to Japanese 
aggression, and though Japan was finally defeated in World War II, 
the economic and spiritual exhaustion led to the collapse and defeat 
of the national government of the mainland and the success of the 
communist armies. It was the combination of these three forms of 
military opposition which overwhelmed the nationalist effort. 
In retrospect, the elements for central unity were present in the 
nationalist phase. The nationalist army itself was organized as a 
central force though regional armies continued to create problems 
6. In 1934 the communists were forced out of their base in southern Kiangsi 
Province and neighboring provinces by the nationalist blockade strategy and went on 
the "long march," a costly retreat to Shensi Province into a much less favorable 
position. See Michael!raylor, op. cit., pp. 415-18 and Franz Michae1, Mao and the 
Perpetual Revolution, Woodbury New York: Barrons Educational Series, 1977, pp. 
43-47. 
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(Sian incident, etc.).1 Most of all, nationalism had become the new 
unifying ideology. The first of Sun Yat-sen's three principles, it gave 
the name to the party and the government and by its very concept 
was a centralizing force. As a concept, nationalism stresses the 
common interests of a people, connected by ties of blood, generally 
manifested by a community of language, and bound by common 
beliefs, customs, and a common cultural tradition and history. It is in 
principle the antitheses of class struggle, domestic or international, 
and of international revolution, and, on a lesser scale, of any form of 
division or of separatism within the nation. 
C. The Communist System 
As an ideology Marxism-Leninism is a totally centralized system. 
The communist party, claiming to be the "vanguard of the proletar-
iat," dominates society as well as the state. Since the party asserts its 
total control over the state and society, there is no clear demarcation 
between the two. In both society and state, the party members are the 
new elite, those who are functionaries of the state. In the party the 
so-called "democratic centralism" is central rather than democratic 
and stresses the authority of the central leadership, whether 
theoretically "collective" or, practically, always tending towards 
one-man rule. Any power struggle is therefore normally a factional 
· battle within the party. Since the party claims to possess the 
ideological truth, such power struggle even if over specific policies 
has always to be argued also in ideological terms, the loser being a 
right-wing or left-wing deviationist from the correct line. 
It is in this framework that the communist system of regional 
structures and control has to be understood. It is a system in which 
security comes before efficiency, and the party line determines all 
social and economic as well as political decisions. If in imperial times 
there was a division of authority on the provincial level, the 
communists developed this division much further, making use of 
their conceptual framework. As at the center, a party and an 
administrative structure were established in the provinces, each 
responsive to its respective central authority. To avoid concentration 
7. In December 1936 Chiang Kai-shek flew to Sian to inveigh insubordinate 
provincial troops from Manchuria to continue their campaign against the communist 
armies. In turn Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by the troops and their commanders 
and released only after he had agreed to abandon the campaign and lead a united front 
resistance against the anticipated Japanese attack against China. See Michael/Taylor, 
op. cit., pp. 419-21; Michael, Mao and the Perpetual Revolution, pp. 50-55. 
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of provincial authority in one hand, separate functionaries were 
appointed as a rule as provincial party secretaries and governors, 
respectively. However, in order to strengthen interdependence and 
control, a system of intermeshing appointments was introduced under 
which generally the first party secretary was concurrently deputy 
governor of the province while the governor was concurrently second 
or third provincial party secretary. Such interlocking appointments 
were obviously meant to guarantee cooperation while at the same 
time leaving the party in control. Second, third, and lower party 
secretaries and deputy governors were linked through combined 
appointments in the same manner. Party control at the center and 
party control at the provincial level were thus to insure the full party 
dominance and prevent any provincial autonomy, resistance, or 
defiance of the center - as long as "democratic centralism" remained 
unchallenged. If and when this system of separate appointments was 
discontinued and one person occupied the leading provincial party 
and administrative posts, especially if combined with military 
command or commissar position, the danger of provincial defiance of 
central control or what the communists called "individual kingdoms" 
or "mountaintop" insubordination would and did reappear. It was for 
the very purpose of avoiding this danger that, after the first phase of 
military occupation in 19498 (when the country was divided into 
military regions), and after the lesson of the purge of the Manchurian 
party head and administrator Kao Kang,9 the communists, in setting 
up a civil structure, established this intricate system of division and 
intermeshing of provincial authority. 
Economic Control. Through the five-year plan of 1953 another 
line of central control over the provinces was introduced in the 
economic field. The five-year plan was centrally conceived and 
directed, and the allocation of material, labor, and, most of all, funds 
to the industrial plants was handled mainly by the vertically 
organized central industrial ministries which also determined price, 
8. After the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, China was at first 
divided into six military administrative regions by the Organic Law of the Great 
Administrative Area Governments of December 16, 1949. Whatever civilian adminis-
tration was set up, was placed under army control. 
9. Kao Kang had been a local communist leader in Yenan before Mao's arrival 
there at the end of the long march. Though he did not belong to Mao's leadership 
group, Kao Kang had supported Mao in previous power struggles and had been 
appointed top administrator in industrialized Manchuria after the establishment of the 
People's Republic. In 1954 he was accused of having attempted to build an 
"independent kingdom," was purged and said to have committed suicide. 
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wages, and the like. Though the revenue procurement· was in part 
handled by the provincial authorities, who collected 60 percent of 
government revenues while 40 percent were directly received by the 
central government from major enterprises under central manage-
ment. the central authorities controlled all use of funrls through its 
planning. 
The central allocation of resources permitted the planners to 
carry out a policy of equalizing regional disparity by transferring 
income and wealth from the more developed to the more backward 
regions. This policy of leveling economic growth was clearly designed 
to mitigate for strategic as well as political reasons the existing 
imbalance between the most developed regions of the country, the 
large cities on the East coast and in Manchuria, and the provinces 
and regions of the hinterland, that were lagging behind in their 
development. It was the part's decision that dictated this policy which 
was, economically, undoubtedly a drag on the progress of the most 
advanced regions and therefore disadvantageous to them and to the 
full promotion of China's economic potential. 
This centralized system of the first five-year plan was somewhat 
modified in the later 1950s when, beginning with the second five-year 
plan, the provincial authorities were asked to share in the economic 
planning in order to avoid at least some of the inordinate waste and 
duplication caused by overcentralized planning. The principle was 
that the various economic plans drawn up by the provinces were to be 
integrated into the central economic plan. 
Some observers assumed that through this policy of delegating 
part of the planning to the provincial authorities, provincial auton-
omy was strengthened at least in this crucial economic area. 10 If so, 
the provinces would, however, have been able to control a larger part 
of their own resources for their own regional development and 
prevent the transfer of a greater share of their surplus to the center 
for allocation to other regions. 11 In practice, as is clear now, this 
assumed decentralization was never meant to permit any real 
authority of the provinces over the allocation of their own resources. 
The system of taking from the wealthier regions to give to the poorer 
10. See Audrey Connithorne, The Budget and the Plan in China: Central-Local 
Economic Relations, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1972. 
11. See Nicholas Lardy, "Economic Planning in the PROC: Central-Provincial 
Fiscal Relations," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, China: A Reassess-
ment of the Economy, Washington, D.C., 1975. 
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ones was, as the data show, continued. 12 The classical example is 
Shanghai, which until today contributed one sixth of the national 
revenue and surrendered 90 percent of its income to the central 
government for use elsewhere.13 
To avoid any misunderstc>nding it must also be stressed again 
that these measures of decentralization were at the most a delegation 
of command within the party, not any granted autonomy of local 
development outside the party's framework. To prevent provincial 
autonomy, the party, as has been pointed out, worked not only 
through the central government, but also through the provincial and 
district party structure. In addition, the party had its committees and 
secretaries in the industrial plants, so that party supervision came 
indeed down to the grass roots level not only in agriculture and 
community life in villages and cities, but also in the modern 
industrial sector of the economy. Thus, the only possibility of 
autonomy would have occurred if there had been an easing of 
cohesion or of centralization within the party itself. This was not the 
case before the cultural revolution and, as shall be seen, is not 
intended today, though a doctrinal crisis may have raised a basic 
issue which the Chinese communist party never had to face before. 
D. The PLA 
The key to political control in the Chinese communist system 
was, however, the People's Liberation Army. In both imperial and 
nationalist times military power had been a decisive factor in 
establishing governments and guaranteeing their power. Under both 
systems, however, an enduring government had to shift from military 
power to civilian administration. In imperial times many short-lived 
dynasties were but the usurpation of power by an ambitious general; 
only the revival of the examination system and the reestablishment 
of civilian administration guaranteed any dynastic longevity. In the 
nationalist period, short as it was, its system of law and civil 
administration had taken hold before World War II. 
The communist system provided a special role for the military. 
This role was the consequence of Lenis's strategy for communist 
seizure of power in the non-industrial world of Asia, in what is called 
today in Chinese communist terminology the "Third World" of 
developing countries. Lenin's Strategy Number Two, as it may be 
12. Ibid. 
13. Information provided to author by U.S. government specialist. 
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called, was designed to take the place of the so-called "proletarian 
revolution," which was, in its original form of urban worker 
uprisings, the general strike and street fighting, inapplicable in 
countries where there was little or no "proletariat"; instead it was 
used to expolit the emerging nationalism of the colonial world for 
communist purposes. "National liberation movements" - Lenin's 
term- were to use nationalism by means of a communist United 
Front with nationalist movements, which were to be taken over from 
within for a direct transition from "Feudalist bureaucracy" without 
full development of a "bourgeois" phase to socialism and 
communism.14 Such "national liberation movements" were in practice 
to be organized as "Wars of National Liberation," a method still part 
of the communist armory in 1981. · 
In China, which became the chief testing ground of Lenin's new 
strategy, this meant rural-based military organization, so often 
misinterpreted as "peasant war" or "peasant uprising." The term for 
this form of political-military organization was "revolutionary army," 
a term coined and applied by Lenin and Stalin, and transformed by 
Mao Tse-tung from Stalin's quote of 192615 into the effective political 
slogan, "Political power grows out of the barrel of the gun." Such a 
"revolutionary army" was in itself the political force that made the 
revolution rather than the professional tool of a civilian communist 
party, as the Red Army had been in the Bolshevik Revolution. 
Indeed, in China, and later in similar "wars of national liberation," 
party and army were one, a party-army that combined in the civil 
war period, for all practical purposes, military command with 
whatever administration was established in communist controlled 
areas. As a result, all older Chinese communist leaders, with very 
few exceptions, were either military commanders or military commis-
sars, or both. 
It was this tradition that resulted in the special role of the PLA 
in Chinese communism, not only during the civil war, but also after 
the establishment of the People's Republic, and the political role of 
the PLA commanders added a new dimension to the problem of 
regionalism. In fact, in the first three years of the communist regime, 
when China was divided into five military regions, government was 
in practice a military occupation, under whose tutelage an adminis-
trative infrastructure was to be created. Even after this new 
14. See the Soviet textbook, Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, Moscow: 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963, pp. 394tf. 
15. See Michael, Mao and the Perpetual Revolution, op. cit. note 6, pp. 12-13. 
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infrastructure had taken the place of the initial military administra-
tion, a military administrative system remained superimposed on the 
provincial party and government institutions referred to earlier. The 
country was divided into eleven. military regions directly responsible 
to Peking and under them in to 29 military districts, one for each 
province, municipality, or special area. These were the regional 
military units that caused problems for central authority. Even 
before and especially during the Cultural Revolution, some of the 
military region commanders or commissars combined their positions 
with those of the provincial party secretaries and chairmen of the 
provincial revolutionary committees. Hsu Shih-yu in Nanking and 
Chen Hsi-lien in Mukden who had been commanders in their regions 
for 15 and 20 years respectively and had combined such military with 
political power, are cases in point. 
During the Cultural Revolution the PLA had been Mao's main 
tool of power. When he destroyed the party and provincial govern-
ment structures which he could no longer control, Mao had to rely -on 
the PLA under Lin Piao16 to provide the real force behind the Maoist 
Red Guards. The PLA, however, was not a monolith. The traditional 
organizational division into four or five field armies/7 which dated 
from the civil war and under which military careers and promotions 
had largely taken place within each field army, now came into play. 
While the First Field Army suffered purges, and the Second and 
Third more or less retained their strength, Lin Piao's Fourth Field 
Army gained hegemony in the military and political arena, tempting 
its leader to try to become Mao's successor. This division among the 
field armies was further complicated by the distinction between the 
central army corps and centralized units like the navy and air force 
on the one hand and the garrison forces stationed in the provinces on 
the other. It was at that time that near military clashes were 
narrowly avoided when some PLA provincial garrisons sided with the 
local party and government officials againt the Red Guard attacks. 
Only the superior strength of the central army corps and units under 
Lin Piao prevented successful regional defiance of Mao's revolution-
ary scheme. 
16. Lin Piao, during the civil war commander of the Fourth Field Army in 
Manchuria, was after 1959 Minister of Defense, and, under Mao, chairman of the 
Military Affairs Committee. He was Mao's most loyal supporter among the military 
commanders. See Michael, Mao and the Perpetual Revolution, op. cit. note 6, pp. 43-45. 
17. See William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A History of 
Communist Military Politics, 1927-1971, New York: Praeger, 1973. 
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The purge of Lin Piao and of Fourth Field Army- commanders 
that continued into the post-Mao period raised questions about the 
political role of the PLA, questions that have remained as yet 
unanswered_ Teng Hsiao-ping, formerly political commissar of the 
Second Field Army, is believed to have considerable support from 
that faction of the PLA; but the de-emphasis of military moderniza-
tion and of the political role of the PLA in the program of economic 
and social rehabilitation that the new leadership is trying to initiate 
may not be a welcome change for the older generation of PLA leaders_ 
Before Mao's death, a policy of musical chairs was carried out in 
1973 - then the period of the first rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-ping 
- in which eight of the eleven commanders of the military regions 
were rotated in their posts with the obvious aim of weakening their 
regional attachment. Among the most important changes were the 
transfer of Hsu Shih~yu from Nanking to Canton in exchange for the 
Canton commander and the transfer of Ch'en Hsi-lien from a 
powerful regional post in Mukden to the more restraining political 
center of Peking, a position from which he was finally removed in 
1981. After Teng's second rehabilitation and his assumption of the 
leading position of power, another such transfer of regional comman-
ders in January 1980 was obviously designed to further weaken any 
regional autonomy of the military leadership. 
Yet the role of the PLA is indisputably still important. On March 
17, 1981, the army's official newspaper, the Liberation Daily, came 
out with an editorial that attacked all those who turned against Mao 
Tse-tung. The editorial focused on the as yet unreleased film by the 
film writer Pai Hua entitled "Bitter Love," in which the author 
allegedly cast doubts on the policies of the party and, in particular, 
the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Alluding to the film, the Liberation 
Daily stated: 
Some literary and art works openly disobey the four basic 
principles, paint a dark picture of our party and nation, distort 
and smear patriotism, express grievances against the socialist 
system and the people's democratic dictatorship, and venomously 
mock and totally negate Comrade Mao Tse-tung.'8 
In opposing such criticism of the party and of Mao, the editorial held 
that: 
. . . to discard the banner of Mao Tse-tung thought and even 
criticize Chairman Mao's correct thinking and speeches ... will 
18. Liberation Daily, March 17, 1981. 
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lead China on a dangerous road. It will make us suffer and end in 
disaster. 19 
Equally critical of the new economic policy, the paper stated that: 
It has been thought that when the people have more money in 
their hands and when consumer goods such as television sets, 
radios, and tape recorders, washing machines, cameras, and 
refrigerators are popularized, our country will become a modern 
and powerful socialist state. This kind of understanding is very 
lopsided.20 
Instead of thinking "bonuses, overtime pay, and more money," the 
Chinese should concentrate on "socialism and hard work." The paper 
demanded: 
Today we must continue to depend on Mao Tse-tung thought to 
unite the people, overcome difficulties, and concentrate on 
working with one heart and mind towards the four 
modernizations. 21 
This critical reaction by the chief mouthpiece of the PLA against 
the government policy of de facto de-Maoization and shift from 
Maoist ideological to a more practical if as yet undetermined 
economic policy appears to have been taken seriously enough by Teng 
to modify, at least for the moment, the present line. 22 In April 1981, 
new directives appeared emphasizing the merits of Maoist-style hard 
work, warning against "worshipping capitalist things" and discourag-
ing contacts with foreigners "who asked too many questions."23 At the 
May 1 festivities in Peking there was no official parade, but the 
portriats of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin were displayed again 
together with the portrait of Mao Tse-tung. A day earlier, on April 
30, Vice Premier Huang Hua had declared that the party had reached 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Teng had to placate the military not only because they still hold the only real 
power in case of emergency in many regions, but also since military men still fill a 
considerable number of administrative central and regional economic decision-making 
posts, though they are often unprepared and ignorant in economic matters. 
23. Personal information supplied to the author in Peking, April, 1981. 
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a consensus on judging the late chairman Mao Tse-tung: "His 
contributions to China were primary and his mistakes were 
secondary."24 Huang Hua also maintained that "Mao Tse-tung 
thought will remain the guiding thought of our party and state."25 
This shift in emphasis by the ruling faction of Teng H siao-ping 
was obviously designed to provide a united platform for the party 
central committee meeting scheduled to be held in June of 1981.26 
If Teng has had to compromise his policy line, at least 
temporarily, to please the military without whose support he could 
not remain in power, the question remained whether the PLA's 
proclaimed loyalty to the image of Mao Tse-tung is inherently 
ideological or whether it is rather based on a concern with 
maintaining its own privileged position. The renewed stress by the 
Liberation Daily on the four modernizations, for instance, included by 
implication a reminder not to neglect the modernization of defense, 
placed on the back burner by the new government policy of cutting 
down on the overextended modernization plans of the recent past and 
instead to "readjust, restructure, consolidate, and improve""' the 
existing economic plants particularly at the expense of the defense 
industry and modernization. More important even may be the 
question whether this critical attitude towards the new line was 
shared throughout the ranks or whether a division among the 
military could be discerned that would separate horizontally older 
from younger officers as indicated by some exhortations to younger 
officers not to be taken in by capitalist temptations, or even vertically 
separate different regional commands. On this may depend how far 
Teng will have to go to maintain the needed unity and for how long 
he has to follow a line of compromise. For the PLA still remains the 
only force that could maintain authority in case of unrest and 
upheavals, and it remains in the wings as the final arbiter of any 
potential conflict. Yet he makes his peace with the PLA, it appears 
that eventually Teng will have to return to his new economic policy. 
24. People's Daily, April 30, 1981. 
25. Ibid. 
26. At the Plenum in June 1981, the verdict on Mao became official. While Mao 
had rendered "indelible meritorious service in founding and building up our party," he 
had committed grave "mistakes concerning class struggle in a socialist society," and 
had caused "most severe setbacks and heaviest losses" to the country and its people. 
Maoism was out doctrinally as well as practically. 
27. This slogan was incorporated in the communique of the Sixth Plenum (of the 
CPC), June 30, 1981. 
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E The System of Checks and Balances 
To facilitate the execution of the new regime's new policy and to 
counter any possibility of regional defiance, a new system of regional 
checks and balances has been established in the post-Mao period. 
Building on the pre-Cultural Revolution past, the provincial author-
ity of the party and the administration has been restructured and 
redefined, divided, and intermeshed. The revival of the People's 
Congresses and their standing committees has added a third element 
of check and balance to this system. The separation of military region 
and military district command and commissar positions from political 
power by separate appointments was meant to evade any danger of 
military usurpation of regional autonomy while preserving the 
military insurance of central control over the regions. It was a system 
based on security, leaving little if any leeway for individual initiative 
at the regional level. 
The chart at the end of this paper indicates the complexity of the 
system and gives the names of the political, military, and administra-
tive personnel as of spring 1981. It shows that in spite of the removal 
of the commanders of military regions from concurrent political 
appointments and the divison of authority between party secretaries, 
governors, and chairmen of standing committees of provincial 
People's Congresses, there are still many dual assignments. Quite a 
few of the party's provincial first secretaries are simultaneously 
chairmen of the standing committees of the provincial People's 
Congresses or even governors of the province. Of particular interest 
appears to be the fact that several of the military districts' political 
commissars of the PLA and at least two of the political commissars of 
the military regions hold simultaneous posts as party secretaries and 
occasionally as governors or chairmen of the standing committees of 
the People's Congresses. The PLA, it appears, is still a major factor in 
the revamped provincial structure. If this list is extended to the great 
number of second, third, fourth, and other provincial party secretar-
ies and the substantial number of other provincial party officials and 
to the deputy governors and department heads in the provincial 
administration, too numerous to list on this chart, the extensive 
degree of intermeshing of the political and administrative structures 
and of the PLA's political officers becomes apparent. Of equal interest 
may be the fact that most of those newly appointed or those 
maintained in office, possibly with the exception of some posts in 
Hunan and Shantung provinces, can be regarded as loyal to Teng 
Hsiao-ping's faction. This is the bureaucratic backbone of Teng and 
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his group, a strong base, provided the PLA can be kept in line. But 
the very intricacies of this complicated structure, the immobility and 
even the corruption of such a self-contained organization could be 
regarded as a serious impediment in any attempt to provide 
initiatives to local economic development outside the channels of 
command which this bureaucracy provides. 
F. The New Economic Policy 
De-Maoization in China, as far as it went, has been an endeavor 
to escape the disastrous economic consequences of thirty years of 
Mao's rule, especially of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution, recognized in the People's Republic today as unmitigated 
disasters. The attempt in April and in June of 1981 to salvage some 
of Mao's doctrinal image by a party "consensus" proclaiming that 
Mao's merits outweighed his mistakes28 remained at best a vague 
general assertion, untested in the area of practical political and 
economic measures. 
In fact, after Teng Hsiao-ping had resumed party and govern-
ment leadership, the Four Modernizations in agriculture, industry, 
defense, and science represented a 180-degree change of course from 
Maoist policy to a regular communist program. 
The Four Modernizations were at first widely touted as the 
cure-all that would solve all of China's economic ills and would 
establish her, by the end of the century as a leading economic and 
political power. This view, which was shared at the time by many 
American specialists in and out of government, was soon disproven. 
Inflation, large budget deficits, unemployment, and an unfavorable 
balance of trade forced Peking to abandon the exaggerated plans, 
cancel and abort many of the large projects and foreign contracts, and 
shift to a policy of "readjustment, restructuring, consolidation, and 
improvement", meaning, in effect, to work within the existing 
industrial plant system, by closing down unprofitable ventures and 
consolidating and improving existing plants. 
This shift also ended the policy of regional self-sufficiency, a 
survival of Maoist ideas. In an article of June 14, 1980, the 
Kuangming Daily criticized the past ten years for disregarding the 
imbalance of regional potential and demanded that local advantages 
be brought into fuller play. The People's Daily of August 8, 1980, 
repeated the argument for recognizing regional disparities through a 
28. See the communique of the Six Plenum (of the CPC), June 30, 1981. 
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policy of developing each region's superior features in investment 
planning. This was to be done, however, not by the region, but by the 
center. The negative example cited was the great effort made 
between 1966 and 1978 in reducing coal shipments from north to 
south by investing large amounts in unprofitable coal production in 
such southern provinces as Kiangsu at five to six times the 
production price of Shansi, violating "economic laws." If instead the 
700 million Renminbi (RMB $1 = U.S. $0.60) spent on coal production 
in Kiangsu had been used one half for investment in light industry in 
Kiangsu and one half in expanded coal production in Shansi, a 
profitable exchange, so the argument ran, would have resulted. This 
argument, then, turning against past Maoist concepts of regional 
self-sufficiency, favored the role of central planning, as represented 
by Chen Yun and his associates. In contrast, Hsueh Mu-ch'iao, Teng's 
leading exponent of reform economics, ba~ked by Chao Tse-yang, 
Teng's leading administrator, promoted a policy of decentralization 
by providing greater leeway for provincial and local decision-
making, and also by permitting participation of management in local 
production plans, the so-called "market economy." In the fall of 1980, 
the argument was joined. At the National People's Congress session 
in September, Yao I-lin, Teng's finance and planning expert, while 
recognizing the continuing problems of budget deficits, inflation, and 
unemployment, maintained that these could be handled under the 
new policy of economic readjustment and decentralization. In Novem-
ber and December, low-level commentaries on severe difficulties of 
local enterprises, caused by the unavailability of power, a disorga-
nized transportation system, and dislocated planning put this opti-
mistic view into question. The grain deficit as well as the energy 
shortage were too serious to be ignored. As a result, a Central Work 
Conference in December shifted its focus of debate from an intended 
political resolution (resolving the problem of Hua Kuo-feng's status) 
to a discussion of the economy and a retreat from the policy of Teng's 
faction. The outcome was: 1) a new stress on strong central control of 
the economy; 2) an emphasis on the party's primary political and 
ideological work with stress on spiritual incentives (Maoist slogans of 
the "foolish old man removing the mountain," of "fearing neither 
hardship nor death," reappeared, and the example of the "good soldier 
Lei Feng" was held up again); 3) a return to trade union work as a 
matter of labor control; and finally 4) the reemergence of a foreign 
policy debate. Teng's anti-Soviet policy came under attack and was 
defended in a fascinating reference to the historical argument 
between Tso Tsung-tang and Li Hung-chang over Central Asian 
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versus coastal defense policies, stressing the importance of maintain-
ing China's Central Asian position against the western neighbor.29 
The attack against Teng's economic decentralization policy was thus 
linked with a "debate" on the basic assumptions of China's position 
between the Soviet and the Western world. This r.hallenge to the 
whole new line of Teng's policy and the revived emphasis on central 
planning and spiritual incentives did not, however, end the search for 
a practical answer to the economic malaise. This answer remained 
linked to the success or failure of the new economic policy with which 
the Teng faction was experimenting. This policy was based on 
economic decentralization and the introduction of a degree of "market 
economy." 
Economic decentralization and regional economic development 
can be accomplished in two different ways; one is delegation of 
command and economic decision-making from the center to provincial 
and local party and administrative authorities; the other is a 
measure of economic freedom, altogether outside of the command 
structure of the party through so-called "market economy." The 
official claim was that present policy was to combine planning with 
market economy in a joint venture, the details of which appear to 
have remained somewhat vague. 
Such a limited "market economy" was at first experimentally 
tested in Szechuan Province, then under the administration of Chao 
Tse-yang who was, partly because of his success, brought to Peking to 
head the central government, his program having moved with him. A 
quasi-official formula for this policy was given in Beijing Review on 
November 24, 1980. It read: "Adjustment through the market under 
the guidance of state planning."30 To reassure those who might be 
alarmed that through this "market economy" the spectre of "capital-
ism" might raise its ugly head, the review stated that "as long as the 
state remains in control of the most important materials and 
products, things will never get out of hand."31 
It was clearly this limitation which severly restricted the policy 
of "market economy." In theory some industrial plant managers in a 
few selected consumer industries, especially textiles and other light 
industries, had been given limited freedom of decision-making in 
prod~cing goods for the market beyond the plan and selling them at 
29. See Kuangming Daily, February 10, 1981; see also People's Daily, January 8, 
1981, implying a stronger policy towards Taiwan. 
30. See Beijing Review, no. 47 (Nov. 24, 1980), p. 25. 
31. Ibid. 
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profit, a profit of which they, according to one claim, were permitted 
to retain 20 percent (according to other information, only 9.5 percent) 
for use as bonuses or investment for expansion. To accomplish this 
they had their representatives explore the market and obtain special 
loans from government banks at reasonable interest rates, given on 
the basis of the expected profitability of the venture. In other words, 
in contrast to allotted government funds, given without regard for 
profit, the managers were in this case accountable for profitable use 
of the loan. For this purpose the managers were supposedly able to 
obtain raw materials from the market, set prices, and, theoretically, 
hire and fire workers, decide on designs and quantity and quality 
according to demand and taste of the clientele; in other words, 
produce on the basis of demand and profitability. This additional 
production for market demand was, however, permissible only after 
fulfillment of the production plan, and was thus to be over and 
beyond the regular plan, which remained in force. 
This experiment was presumably successfully tested in Szechuan 
in October 1978 where six enterprises were selected for the new 
policy. In 1979, the experiment was extended to 84 enterprises and 
was claimed by Chinese communist economists to have increased 
production in that same year by 16.17 percent and profits by 23.3 
percent. Of the additional production the state was to receive 64 
percent. The rest was used by the enterprise for investment and 
allegedly to "double salaries" according to a policy of "more to the 
nation, more to enterprises, and more to staff and workers."32 
In 1980 this policy was claimed to have been applied nationwide 
to 6600 enterprises out of a total of over 300,000 enterprises. Though 
only a small percentage of the total, the selected enterprises were 
larger ones and accounted for a higher percentage of production in 
their branches than their number might indicate. All of them were in 
the field of textile or other light consumer industries. In Chekiang, 
for instance, 26 percent of the textile mills and other consumer 
industries were claimed to have been included in this experiment of 
partly increasing production for a "market economy," a figure which 
was expected to increase to 30 percent in 1981. The actual increase of 
production for "market economy" was, however, believed to be 
considerably less than the claims advanced for Szechuan and was 
32. See article by Liu Kuoguang, "On Reforming China's Economic Management 
System," in China's Economy in the 1980's, Hong Kong: Economic Information and 
Agence, June 1980. 
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estimated by some observers as being more in the vicinity of 5-10 
percent of the total production of these 6600 enterprises. 
More important than the question of percentage increase was, 
however, the reality of the claim of the independence of a segment of 
"market economy" from the control of party planners. In fact, the 
freedom of action of the plant managers of these specially selected 
consumer industries was much more circumscribed in practice than 
theory proclaimed. For one, though in theory the managers need not 
be party members, in practice it appears that all those on whom there 
has been f?UCh information were indeed party members and were 
therefore under party discipline at the central, provincial, and local 
level. By training and experience they were party bureaucrats 
without education in engineering, business administration, or any 
other relevant work. All their industrial management experience had 
been in the application of orders and directives of the planning 
system. They also could not be easily replaced by trained engineers or 
other qualified personnel because of the catastrophic decline of the 
educational system under Mao's policies of the Great Leap Forward 
and the Cultural Revolution. It will at best take much time to train a 
new generation of qualified personnel to handle any such new 
"market economy." In the meantime party policy would be the only 
standard to be applied by the managers, all the more so since they 
had to have approval for all decisions not only by the party organs at 
the provincial and local levels but also by the party secretary in the 
plant itself in charge of a workers' council who had to be consulted on 
all matters. 
Even aside from this personal limitation and the ever-present 
party discipline, the freedom of action of the manager was in practice 
severely restrained. The concept of the enterprise as "a relatively 
independent commodity producer" which "under the unified planned 
guidance of the state . . . manages its own personnel, finance, 
materials, production supply and marketing . . . a genuinely inde-
pendent economic accounting unit, responsible for its own profits and 
losses" as the Chinese communist author33 prescribes it, has no basis 
in reality. It will be next to impossible for even the most resourceful 
manager to obtain substantial quantities of material outside the 
plan; there is little leeway for him in the controlled price mechanism, 
and though he may in theory fire undisciplined and incapable 
workers, in practice he has no such choice because of the prevailing 
33. Ibid. 
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unemployment. The one thing that the system guarantees is 
employment, the "iron rice bowl" in Chinese communist parlance. 
In the annual or biannual meetings that had been instituted in 
some provinces under the provincial commerce and industry depart-
ments to set quantity, quality, and design for (textile) products, the 
departments as well as the factory managements and shop assistants 
were represented so that plans were jointly formulated, with the 
decision, however, retained by the provincial departments and the 
central ministries. 
As a further intended improvement, specialized companies were 
set up in different industries under the aegis of the party central 
committee, eleven nation-wide by the ministries and twenty four on a 
regional basis, to "readjust the division of work according to 
products." Such "companies" coordinated existing factories for joint 
planning, diversification, and distribution, especially in Peking, 
Shanghai, Tientsin, and Liaoning, i.e., the most advanced industrial 
centers. These were, however, not independent economic planning or 
accounting units, but rather a new type of refinement within the 
planning order. 
The "marketing" segment of consumer industries was thus very 
circumscribed and included as of spring i981 at best a very small 
section of the overall production, not enough to affect it significantly. 
One of the reasons for this limitation appears to be the concern that 
greater leeway would endanger the system itself. As a Chinese 
communist author stated: "In the light of the experience of certain 
socialist countries, to give more power of self-management to the 
enterprise and let the market play a greater role in regulating 
economy would be liable to lead to a series of problems such as 
blindness in production and construction, price fluctuations, one-
sided inclination for profit-seeking, and a wide disparity in incomes," 
a danger "which can and should be prevented" in the Chinese reform 
plans.34 The communists obviously face a dilemma. Since their system 
cannot tolerate a true market economy, all their efforts in this 
direction will remain of necessity stunted. 
The problem, however, goes deeper. A key issue.appears to be 
that of resource distribution among the advanced and backward 
regions of China. The policy of attempting to equalize development by 
syphoning off the revenue from the main surplus regions for 
investment in the backward provinces and regions continues. To lift 
34. Ibid. 
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the whole country simultaneously out of its economic stagnation 
seems to be entirely impractical. If any breakthrough towards real 
economic advancement is to be accomplished, it would appear to 
depend on giving those regions with the greatest potential a free 
reign to use their resources for their own development. In time their 
success might affect the rest of the country. These urban regions 
would then also be in a better position to absorb the constant stream-
of migration from an impoverished countryside which poses one of the 
most difficult demographic problems faced by Peking today. 
Such a policy would necessitate a restriction of central control in 
most of the industrial sector. It would also imply economic elbow 
room for a professional industrial management group that has still to 
be created. Most of all it would have to be a regional development. 
As of now there was no indication that Peking would allow such 
differences in economic development. On the contrary, in permitting 
additional profits "attention must be paid to the effects on the 
neighboring areas; discrepancies of undue extent must not be 
allowed."35 The argument runs that such differences may not be the 
result of the enterprise's own efforts but of "objective advantages" 
such as "natural surroundings, differences in prices, more imported 
technology and equipment from abroad," and for this reason "the 
state must deal with this problem without bias" by not distributing 
"huge benefits easily obtained by natural advantages" to the 
respective producers.36 In fact "the state must retain a certain portion 
of the total investment instead of putting all the investment funds at 
the disposal of the banks and enterprises" and "the proportion kept 
by the state is to be distributed to various sectors concerned in order 
to adjust the proportional relations."37 
What is at stake here is in essence the communist order of a 
centrally planned and controlled economy: No region and no major 
urban center can be permitted to develop on its own and become a 
danger to the centralized communist economic system. A limited 
delegation of command is as far as this reform program was willing to 
go to date. And even that part had become a matter of argument 
among contending factions in Peking. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid. 
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G. The Crisis of Confidence 
This problem of the need and of the danger of economic regional 
latitude and enterprise autonomy must be seen in the light of a 
larger challenge to the communist order in the People's Republic, the 
challenge called by the communists "the crisis of confidence." With 
the collapse of the cult of Mao and the grim denouement of the 
disaster caused by the fanatical belief in Mao's pronouncements and 
policies, it appears only natural that many of those duped have 
finally lost all faith in that Marxist doctrine from which Mao derived 
his ideological authority and utopian fantasies. To separate those 
from an alleged "scientific" Marxism is all the more difficult since the 
magic formula "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought" is for 
political reasons being maintained. It is obviously no easy task for 
Peking's ideologists to draw the line between the two; but that is now 
being attempted. To counter the challenge to the doctrine and the loss 
of faith resulting from the failure of Mao's policies and the economic 
malaise, numerous articles in 1980 and 1981 strove to defend 
Marxism-Leninism by stressing the difference between "fanatical" 
Marxism (the gang of four) and "scientific" Marxism and between 
"false faith" (the Mao cult) and "real faith" in the doctrine. 
The problem is stated in the following terms: 
Some people think Marxism-Leninism no longer works. There-
fore they are unwilling to study it any longer. In school political 
lessons are not well received. Organs and factories often hold 
political and theoretical study classes in a happy-go-lucky 
fashion. To them, they are just occasions for killing time. Some 
people have become doubtful about Marxism-Leninism. They 
neither believe in it nor study it. This is the so-called confidence 
crisis.38 
The argument then runs that the "collapse of confidence" was caused 
by Lin Piao and the gang of four who are accused of changing "the 
revolutionary theory from a science into theology." The "rites" before 
Mao's pictures, the "religious atmosphere," the "mad passion" for 
studying Mao's works, the "chanting of quotations" were causing 
"blind faith" that has now collapsed - a plausible argument indeed. 
The more difficult part for the pamphleteer was to argue that 
38. See the article by Guo Luiji, "Commenting on the So-Called 'Confidence 
Crisis,'" Wen Hui Bao, Hong Kong, January 13, 1980. 
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Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought was still valid because it 
was a "science" which must be studied. The predication is the old 
doctrinal assertion that Marxism is the "revolutionary doctrine of the 
proletariat emancipating itself and all mankind," derived from "the 
laws of the objective world." There has to be a distinction between 
"genuine and sham Marxism-Leninism," there has to be "faith, but 
not blind faith."39 True, "certain Marxist-Leninist conclusions have 
become hackneyed and out of date," but that means only that the 
theory must be developed. The interesting aspect of this very 
defensive argument is that when speaking of the alleged science of 
the doctrine, it is only Marxism-Leninism, and Mao's Thought is 
attached later when he is quoted as claiming that Marxism "fears no 
criticism."40 
Other articles, reacting to the same perceived danger as also 
expressed in student comments and letters to the papers, follow the 
same argument of distinguishing between alleged sham and genuine 
Marxism and the assertion that things have changed for the better 
with the new "criterion for truth," "the price rise of farm produce," 
the new foreign policy and other presumed advances, and a plea for 
time, all having little to do with the crisis of the doctrine.41 Some, 
asserting that democracy "belongs to a class," are distinguishing 
between "socialist democracy" and that "bourgeois democracy" which 
is singled out as a target for attack and as a dangerous instrument of 
vilifying the dictatorship of the proletariat for violating human 
rights."42 Basically the arguments repeat the old shibboleths, such as 
that of the "advanced, middle, and backward level" with the 
assurance that the vast majority of the young is advanced and good, 
receptive to reform; and it is "only a handful of young people" who 
"pursue the rotten lifestyle of the bourgeoisie." "Red and expert" is 
the goal again, but "persuasion" is to be the best method. 
One may wonder whether the old slogans and assurances are 
sufficient to deal with a genuine intellectual crisis. The dilemma of 
Marxism, to reconcile doctrine and reality, has become more serious 
in the wake of the bankruptcy of Maoist rule. If there is doubt in the 
minds of the communist leadership about the attitude of the young 
and the disillusionment in communist doctrine among a large section 
of the population which was perhaps always more passively resigned 
than ever taken in, the most serious concern must relate to the 
39. Ibid. 
40. Ibid. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Ibid. 
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attitude, the mood, and the morale of the military on whom in the 
last resort the communist power has to rest. That there was such a 
concern can be inferred from the editorials, commentaries, and 
statements by leading commanders that appeared in the army 
newspaper and other national papers from the fall of 1979 to the 
spring of 1981. The tenor differed somewhat from the appeals to the 
youth and the general population. There was still the leftist influence 
of Lin Piao to be taken care of, or what was called the need to liberate 
thinking "from an ossified or semi-ossified state." On the other hand 
"some comrades, mainly young comrades" have apparently not 
understood the limits of "ideological emancipation." To "peddle the 
declining, decadent ideology . . . of the contemporary Western world" 
or the "sham democracy and the so-called 'human rights' of the 
bourgeoisie" would mean "a great ideological retreat."~ The young 
comrades, many of whom joined the party during the Cultural 
Revolution and were promoted during that time are lacking "the 
basic party knowledge and have to be educated about the "sham 
socialism" of Lin Piao and the gang of four, but also about the 
non-proletarian ideal of the capitalist and feudalist classes. 
If there is such a ferment, and if the democracy wall has been 
abolished, if the forced migration to the countryside is upheld, and if, 
most of all, the expected improvements are lagging, then the latest 
discontent may bring greater pressures on the rulers and may show 
itself first in this or that region where conditions are most serious. 
Any study of regionalism must therefore deal not only with the 
political game and struggle of factions and the grim issues of 
economic realities, but also with the most fundamental problems of 
beliefs and values and their effect on the policy and the system. 
The one hundred eighty-degree tum away from Maoism may 
only be the beginning. The restoration of and new emphasis on 
private plots in agriculture, the expansion of free markets, most of all 
the new policy of the envisaged autonomy of light consumer goods 
industries and movement towards a market economy, may have some 
unforeseen consequences. It appears to the non-doctrinal observer 
that any expansion of a true market economy will have to favor those 
urban regions that undoubtedly have the only true potential for 
modernization. The key question may well be whether the ideological 
arguments, listed above, may become linked to these regional issues, 
as a result of either rising expectations or of disappointment of the 
present hopes. 
43. Ibid. 
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